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The colonial period in British India witnessed the rise of different responses articulated by religious communities to both their traditions of scriptural 
and vernacular knowledge systems as well as attempts to make sense of how 
modernity challenged their practices, modes of life, and epistemologies of the 
cosmos that they inhabited. In effect, all of these responses were incubated in 
the laboratory of imperial modernity – new political systems of governance, 
the new science, new epistemologies and pedagogies, print and new media, 
and a world opened up before them albeit within the confines of the status 
of imperial subjects – and perhaps in that sense it would not be incorrect to 
labels them all as ‘modernist’. The failure of the old elites to resist the impe-
rial powers – and the ongoing issue of whether the success of the colonisers 
was somehow linked to their ‘muscular Protestantism’ – led to a rethinking 
of traditions and their refashioning in the image of the conqueror (van der 
Veer 2001; Viswanathan 1989; Prakash 1999). The development of the field 
of Islamic intellectual history in South Asia has brought out in particular five 
or six such responses – and captured the interest of the subject of this volume 
and of this chapter (for example, Muhammad Iqbal) who had a relationship 
in some way or the other with each of them: the return to scripturalism and 
in particular to the texts that portrayed the Prophetic way of life (the hadith) 
in Deoband (India) from 1867, the reaffirmation of the vibrancy and rel-
evance of traditional devotion to the Prophet and Sufi piety of the movement 
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of Aªmad Riżā Khān of Bareilly (India), the alternative scripturalism of the 
ahl al-Qurān in the Punjab (India), the Aligarh movement and its embrace 
of a new colonial elite fashioned on the fields of Eton and in the quadrangles 
of Oxford (United Kingdom), the struggle of survival of the old Shia nawabi 
elites of Avadh to retain status and their epistemologies, and the ‘new faiths’ 
such as the Aªmadī movement with their desire to link reform and recon-
ciliation with modernity through a recourse to an old notion of ‘prophecy 
continuous’ (Metcalf 1982; Sanyal 1996; Qasmi 2011; Lelyveld 1978; Jones 
2012; Friedman 1989). Each one of these appealed to some notion of the tra-
dition, and each one in a sense forged a modernist project appropriate to their 
context. At times, religious traditions retained a sense of autonomy from the 
state but they shared in the emergence of practices of what Foucault called 
‘governmentality’, connecting the techniques of governing the self with tech-
niques of dominating the other (van der Veer 2014; cf. Inda 2005; Lemke 
2011). These movements were thus as constitutive of the ‘apparatus’ of impe-
rial modernity as the British state in India (Agamben 2009).
The old sociological dichotomy between tradition and modernity, which 
examined them chronologically, is, of course, well past its expiry date: these 
movements fashioned their modernity in ways that were spiritual, scriptural, 
philosophical, Muslim, Indian, and modern. Forged in imperial modernity, 
they did much to make that context modern and sustainable as well. The 
impact thus on the British was also quite clear, and how could it not be? As 
Subrahmanyam puts it, ‘[O]nly an utter devotion to structuralist forms of 
history and structuralist understandings of culture – and a corresponding 
neglect of diachronic processes – would force us to regard this as an unnatural 
or even an unusual outcome’ (2012: 30).
In that sense, asking the question of the influences on the thinker such 
as Iqbal from Rūmī or Nietzsche, McTaggart or Mullā Íadrā is somewhat 
misleading. He was an existentialist but Kierkegaard, despite his hopeful 
faith, is not a good comparison, as his privileging of action as being owes 
much to Mullā Íadrā. He read Hegel through Mullā Íadrā and Bēdil through 
Bergson. His poetry and prose thus reveals these facets of rather contrapuntal 
readings of texts – in fact, for those excited by how contrapuntal readings lie 
at the heart of postcolonialism, one can do a lot worse than turn back to Iqbal 
(for example, Majeed 2009). Even his own diary or jottings that he initiated 
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on return from Europe in about 1910 and published as Stray Reflections – and 
perhaps in the vein of our discussion it should have been called his Bayāż – 
amply reflects this:
I confess I owe a great deal to Hegel, Goethe, Mirza Ghalib, Mirza Abdul 
Qadir Bedil and Wordsworth. The first two led me into the ‘inside’ of 
things; the third and fourth taught me how to remain oriental in spirit and 
expression after having assimilated foreign ideals of poetry, and the last 
saved me from atheism in my student days. (Iqbal 2012: 53)
After the rupture in the educational system in the subcontinent following 
1857, a number of hybrid Muslim intellectuals such as Iqbal trained in 
European pedagogical methods began to re-assess their intellectual heritage. 
Works were written in Urdu and in English that grappled with the philoso-
phy of Avicenna and Mullā Íadrā, drawing upon the texts that were still (just 
about) being studied in madrasas and were becoming known to German and 
British orientalism (such as the famous Max Horten). It is within this context 
of assessing one’s heritage and seeking a space for it within the contemporary 
context of European thought at the turn of the twentieth century that one 
ought to locate and make sense of Iqbal’s early work on the Islamic philo-
sophical traditions (the subject of his doctorate) as well as the development of 
his thought from these beginnings to his later lectures on the reconstruction 
of religious thought. Iqbal’s engagement with the Islamicate and Persianate 
tradition of ªikmat (beyond analyses of ‘Muslim pantheism’) has been rather 
neglected in scholarship and demands a serious reassessment – Hegel and 
Bergson are privileged over Rūmī and Mullā Íadrā (cf. Raschid 2010).
Iqbal’s own career falls broadly into two parts. His early apprentice-
ship under Sayyid Mīr Óasan (d. 1929) in Sialkot, Dāgh (d. 1905), Shiblī 
Numānī (d. 1914), and Thomas Arnold (d. 1930) culminated in an MA in 
philosophy in 1898 followed by his trip to Europe where he gained an MA at 
Cambridge in 1907 and a PhD from Munich in 1907. These figures bridged 
the traditional and modernist: Sayyid Mīr Óasan and Dāgh representing 
the former, and the friends Numānī and Arnold being associated with the 
Aligarh movement. Óasan was a traditional scholar who taught Iqbal Arabic 
and inspired in him an interest in philosophy and Persian poetry (Óusayn 
2007).
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Dāgh was rather typical of the Delhi intellectuals of his time (Anjum 
1986). Born in 1831, he was initially exposed to the Delhi renaissance that 
included his poetic masters Ghalib and Zauq and to the court itself since his 
mother after the death of his father married Prince Mirzā Fakhrū in 1844 
(Anjum 2001). He fled at the revolt and sought the patronage of first Nawab 
Kalb Alī Khān of Rampur and later in the Deccan Plateau with Nawab 
Mīr Maªbūb Alī Khān. He trained a large number of poets – including 
briefly Iqbal by correspondence – and died in Hyderabad in 1905. As such 
he bridged the classical period of Urdu poetry with the Ghalib circle and 
the court with the rise of modernism in the colonial period and the search 
for identity and belonging in India. Dāgh was a popular poet, famed for his 
erotic verse and for his masnavī style – and had somewhat of a reputation of 
an old court dandy or even a playboy, a figure that recalls the later poet Josh 
Malihabadi (d. 1982) in the twentieth century. Iqbal was his student by cor-
respondence, as Dāgh had been appointed as the laureate at the court of the 
Nizam as attested to in the introduction to Bāng-e darā (The Peal of the Bell) 
where the ‘corrections’ to his ghazals by Dāgh were acknowledged. Some of 
his early ghazals bear the influence of Dāgh’s themes and concerns even if in 
his more philosophical and critical reflections on personhood and identity 
later Iqbal’s verse had more in common with Al†āf Óusayn Óālī and Akbar 
Ilāhābādī. It is quite possible then that the reason that Iqbal sought out Dāgh 
as his teacher was the desire to link himself to the classical poetic tradition 
of the Delhi renaissance (Āzād 1986: 187). Even before leaving for Europe, 
and under the influence of European poets, he set aside the ghazal tradition, 
signalling his break from Dāgh (Āzād 1986). Nevertheless, Dāgh had a large 
number of students – none more famous than Iqbal – and it is very much 
the success of his verse that convinced many of the mobilising force of poetry 
for intellectual and political action in the new century (Íalāª al-Dīn 1986). 
Furthermore, other critics have argued that Faryād-e Dāgh, an important 
autobiographical masnavī composed in 1300/1883 had an influence on a 
number of works, including Shikvā of Iqbal (Parbatī 2010: 106–8).
Shiblī was more of a hybrid scholar who was the first major popular 
historian of modern Muslim South Asia, writing on a range of topics, glorify-
ing heroes of the past, and writing critical appraisals of the intellectual tradi-
tions from a thoroughly orientalised perspective (Nadvī 1970; Íiddīqī 2012; 
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Akhtar et al. 2009; cf. Numanī 1898, 1964, 2012). His project was a rather 
conservative but modernist defence of the faith in favour of latitude through 
rethinking law and theology (McDonough 2005). Shiblī was a strong critic 
of Asharī theology and a proponent of the complementarity of faith and 
reason, critical of the Aligarh school’s dismissal of the tradition as incapable 
of resisting the new philosophy and science (Murad 1973: 3–36). As part 
of this process, he deployed Rūmī – that we also see later in Iqbal. Arnold 
represented the other element of the orientalising Muslim modernism of 
the period (Morison and Gibb 1930; Arnold 1896, 1924). Through their 
association at Aligarh, they were friends and their collaboration bore fruit in 
works such as Arnold’s The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of 
the Muslim Faith.
The fruits of this period were the early poems of ‘Bāng-e darā’, includ-
ing his ‘Himāla’ (Himalaya), ‘Tarāna-ye hindī’ (Indian Anthem – ‘The best 
land in the world is our India; we are its nightingales; this is our garden. . .’), 
‘Tarāna-ye millī’ (The Muslim community’s anthem – ‘China and Arabia 
and ours; India in ours. We are Muslims, the whole world is ours. . .’), ‘Nayā 
shivāla’ (A New Shiva Temple – ‘Let me tell you truth, Brahmin, if you 
will not be offended. The idols of your temples have become old. . .’), and 
‘Shikvā’ (Complaint), which he wrote of the sense of India and nation based 
on the model of Dāgh as well as his elegy for Dāgh (‘Dāgh is dead! Alas! His 
corpse brings adornment to our shoulders, The last poet of Shāhjahānābād is 
dead. . .’) (Matthews 1993: 16–22, 28–29, 31–41).
But before we move to a closer consideration of Iqbal, we need to con-
sider first how Muslim intellectuals before him and contemporary to him 
were trying to make sense of their intellectual heritage within the apparatus 
of imperial modernity and how the study of the Islamic intellectual heritage 
developed in academia within the philosophical taste prevalent in Britain 
and Germany of Iqbal’s student days. Already before the advent of official 
empire there was a shift towards hybrid institutions in which both episte-
mologies and curricula coincided, bringing together selective elements of 
European and North Indian Muslim curricula forging ahead with some of 
the brightest minds of the ‘Delhi renaissance’ at Delhi College run by the 
British and funded by Indian notables (Minault 2000; Pernau 2006). The 
college brought in the skills of the madrasa-trained to be deployed for British 
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pedagogical aims, drawing in Sehbāī, Imām Bakhsh, Ghālib, Āzurda, and 
others. The rise in print and the public sphere consuming intelligence, infor-
mation, and ‘knowledge’ from the West accelerated the process of encounters 
around the pivotal events of 1857 (Íābrī 1953, I: 121–224; Khan 1991: 
65–114; Yūsuf 2008: 47–120; Minault 2005; Pernau 1996). The post-1857 
scenario was rather different, and the hybridity in many ways gave way to an 
internalization of orientalist paradigms and the rise of the role of missionary 
schools in the dissemination of education through a change in the colonial 
government’s policy towards an Anglicist perspective. This new policy had a 
significant ‘civilising’ mission. As the missionaries Henry Elliot and Henry 
Tucker explained in their report on education following 1857:
He [the student] enters the school premises, becomes acquainted with 
mathematical science, with astronomy and geometry. Naturally, he loses 
confidence in his own religion when he finds that it contains so many 
ridiculous and impossible explanations. Propositions of Euclid and Sir Isaac 
Newton confute the fables . . . of their religion . . . It is impossible, even if 
we wished it, to be absolutely neutral in dealing with the false religions of 
India; for they are so intimately blended with false science that we cannot 
teach the simplest lessons of true science without contradicting the false 
sciences contained in their religious books . . . and so far proving their reli-
gions themselves to be false. (Elliot 1858: 67)
In the confidence of this ‘scientistic’ mode coupled with a new metaphysics 
coming from the Enlightenment, intellectuals became increasingly deraci-
nated from their intellectual heritage even as they sought to retain their links. 
Pre-colonial pedagogies and epistemologies became obsolete – or at least 
needed to be rethought in the reform movements mentioned above – and 
were replaced by outsider perspectives. In this way when one analyses the 
reflection on Islamic intellectual history made by Muslims at the turn of the 
twentieth century, one finds racial categories, attitudes, and perspectives on 
thought that were prevalent in Europe in the works later of Max Horten.
To take an example of two works in Urdu in the early twentieth century – 
Āftāb-e ªikmat (The Sun of Philosophy) by Gobind Prasad ‘Āftāb’ dedicated to 
the Bēgum of Bhopal in gratitude and printed at the famous Newal Kishore 
Press in Lucknow in 1916, and Mirat al-ªukamā yā Guldasta-yi farhang 
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(The Mirror of Philosophers or the Bouquet of Culture) of Shams al-ulamā 
Sayyid Imdād Imām ‘Asar’ published in 1879 in Patna (originally written in 
1877). Both are good examples of elite expression and reveal a concern with 
internalising the post-Cartesian mind–body problem and both seem rather 
influenced by the dominance of idealism in British and German philosophy 
of the time – much like we shall see with Iqbal.
Mirāt al-ªukamā is dedicated to J. M. Lewes, magistrate of Bhagalpur 
in Bihar. Imām was a scion of a prominent elite family, which produced a 
number of barristers known for their learning. In the Urdu preface, he states 
that his aim was to present European thought, and to bring it into conversa-
tion with the Arabic Islamic tradition, making it accessible to those who did 
not have access to English sources (Imām 1879). In particular, he considers it 
his remit to introduce a number of European thinkers, especially on matters 
relating to mental states. He also laments the absence of a philosophical lexi-
con in Urdu and apologises for the need to draw upon the Arabic scholastic 
terms that do not quite capture the new European thought he wishes to 
convey. The English preface is somewhat different. He claims to have ‘system-
atically and scientifically cemented together the metaphysical views hitherto 
promulgated by some of the distinguished speculative authors both of Europe 
and Asia’ (Imām 1879: 1). Although he mentions Aristotle, Locke, Descartes, 
and Reid alongside Avicenna, Ghazālī, and Mullā Íadrā, he is rather dismiss-
ive of the contribution of ‘Arabic writers’ on ‘mental science’ partly because 
they ‘blindly adhered’ to Aristotle and partly because they made no original 
contribution: ‘there is no Arabian work treating of mental science’ (Imām 
1879: 3–5, English). He criticises the traditional ulema whom he feels will 
be rather slighted by his account. This is very much an orientalising project 
steeped in the modernist tradition:
I think this is an attempt on my part to make my countrymen aspire for the 
learning and the sciences of the West, to invite my co-religionists to taste 
the honey of the European sciences, and lastly to convince the prejudiced 
sect of the old-typed moulvies, that Europe at present occupies the highest 
position throughout the world in point of knowledge attainable by man. 
If I err not the moulvies are the greatest impediment to the furtherance of 
my views – so that if these my learned friends be gained over to my side, I 
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can justly hope that the future generation may turn out a more reasonable 
class of men than what their fathers are now. I would not be hyperbolical if 
I were to assert that our moulvy sahibs do really consider it a sin to ascribe 
any thing recommendatory to Europe. This view as far as I know has no 
religious basis to stand upon, but simply rests on their groundless belief of 
the imaginary excellence of the old scientific investigations. (Imām 1879: 
6, English).
The most important influences on him seem to be the Scottish philosophers 
Thomas Reid (d. 1796) and Sir William Hamilton (d. 1856) – two thinkers 
associated with empiricism and a logical approach to the analysis of the mind 
and the cosmos known as ‘direct realism’. It was later replaced by idealism 
but Imām’s philosophical tastes, probably incubated in his younger days, 
were rooted in the early part of the nineteenth century. Imām tries to argue 
that the European tradition from its inception was far more concerned with 
matters of the mind, of epistemology, and logic than with metaphysics, the 
concern of Islamic thinkers (Imām 1879: 44–54). Because he holds the opin-
ion that for knowledge to be beneficial it needs to be expressed in English 
he does lament the fact that most of the central works of the Islamic tradi-
tion in India are not available in that language, including Sharª al-mawāqif 
(of Jurjānī (d. 1411)), al-Ufuq al-mubīn (of Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631)), the 
Zawāhid (that is, the three marginalia of Mīr Zāhid Hirawī (d. 1699) on the 
Sharª Tahdhīb al-man†iq, on Sharª al-mawāqif, and on the Sharª Aqāid 
al-a∂udīya), and Sharª Sullam al-ulūm (of Muªibbullāh Bihārī (d. 1707)) 
(Imām 1879: 73). These were key philosophical and theological texts of the 
Dars-e niÕāmī established in the eighteenth century in North India (Malik 
1997: 522–35; Qamaruddīn 1996: 345–52). But even then his examination 
of the psychology of the Islamic tradition is based entirely on Avicenna, 
Fārābī, and Ghazālī, which was also the focus of Orientalist literature as 
well in the same period. It was Bacon and Descartes who brought about the 
revolution that ended the hegemony of the schoolmen (Imām 1879: 87–95). 
Throughout his analysis there is little engagement with the actual contents of 
the works of the Islamic philosophical curriculum in India, and even in the 
biographies of philosophers appended – entitled Rawżat al-ªukamā – there 
are few figures mentioned who were not known to late nineteenth-century 
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orientalists (Imām 1879: 409–535). This is very much a history of philoso-
phy that mentions Arabic figures of significance for medieval scholasticism 
– the expression of a self-orientalised intellectual.
A young Kayasth, Gobin Prasad, authored Āftāb-e ªikmat. Some of the 
prefaces sound rather patronising to him, encouraging his efforts in the study 
of Islamic (thoroughly Pythagoreanising Neoplatonic) philosophy (Āftāb 
1916: 1–3). Prasad thanks the efforts of his father and the Begum of Bhopal 
who supported his education at the Alexandra School (that she had founded 
to train children and prepare them for Aligarh) where he picked up English 
and the desire to read (4). He divides his text into five sections: on propae-
deutics such as the nature of the self, and of key concepts such as form, analy-
sis, and division to demonstrate that there is a radical distinction between 
body and soul; on mathematics (riyāżīyāt, rather traditional Euclidean) that 
begins with a classification of the sciences common to the maqūlātī tradi-
tion of North India; on logic (man†iqīyāt, the Arabic modified Aristotelian 
organon); on natural philosophy (†abīīyāt), starting from Aristotelian hylo-
morphism to traditional Ptolemaic cosmology, including ethics (tahdhīb 
al-akhlāq), and discussions of the afterlife and its pains and pleasures; and 
finally on matters pertaining to reason (aqlīyāt), starting with Pythagoras on 
the intellect and moving onto other opinions and causality and related issues 
in metaphysics. The style is rather mundane and accessible – this is not really 
the analysis of a deep scholar. There is no real attempt to bring in perspec-
tives from other Indian philosophical traditions or indeed of European ones. 
Hardly any sources are cited. The approach to metaphysics in particular is 
both light and selective with a strong emphasis on a Pythagorean approach 
that considers different types of homologies between the animal world, the 
cosmos, and ultimately God, which may be the result of particular influences 
from his teachers (166–75). Similarly, he draws upon the Islamic tradition’s 
naturalisation of the Neoplatonic notion that erotic motion is the animat-
ing force of the cosmos (mediated by Avicenna in particular) (195–200). 
The final chapter on causality even included a nod to the illuminationist 
concept of the ‘world of archetypes’ (ālam al-mithāl) (203–8; cf. Corbin 
1990: 126–30, 174–5). The one theme that one may expect – that is miss-
ing – is any sense of monism but then this is a work devoid of mysticism and 
any serious sustained metaphysics. It is a beginner’s study based on a rather 
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rudimentary understanding of Islamic philosophy as taught in the hybrid 
schools of the colonial period and quite a different expression of that from 
the work of Imām.
So much for the options of his time that ranged from the orientalising to 
the traditional rehearsal of ideas. Iqbal’s relationship with German oriental-
ism can help to elucidate the impact of his doctoral dissertation and locate its 
own orientalising tendencies. The first major historian of Islamic philosophy 
who covered the range of the tradition was Max Horten (1874–1945), whose 
approach to thought betrays the racial categories of the French Orientalist 
Ernest Renan (1823–92), the phenomenological insights of Franz Brentano, 
the transcendental idealism of the neo-Kantians such as Robert Reininger 
(1869–1955), and the egoism of Nietzsche (cf. Daiber 1999). Horten’s 
own work lies at the culmination of a long history of German engagement 
with Islamic thought, in which Hegel’s views in his Lectures on Philosophy of 
History were particularly influential (Almond 2010: 108–34; cf. Manjapra 
2014). Islamic philosophy – including Suhrawardī and Mullā Íadrā – was 
praised as the product of the Persian – the Aryan – mind over the Semitic – 
‘Persia’s role as bearer of Oriental civilization’. Horten’s presentation is often 
clichéd and does not pay sufficient attention to the details of arguments and 
their contexts and is reminiscent of the approaches of Arthur de Gobineau 
(1816–82) and others (de Gobineau 1923). Like Iqbal, he tended to privi-
lege the ‘pantheism’ of the Ibn Arabī school over the Avicennan tradition 
of ‘light-monism’ as he put it, influenced by Indian thought on ‘Islamic 
civilisation’ in his important history Die Philosophie des Islam, first published 
in 1924 and then serialised in English translation in the Pakistani journal 
Islamic Studies from 1972 to 1974 following its German reprint (Horten 
1924). As we see with Iqbal, he devoted a large part of his studies to later 
Islamic philosophy and Sufism, including works on Suhrawardī (d. 1191), 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī ‘the sceptic’ (d. 1210), Na‚īr al-Dīn al-˝ūsī (d. 1274), 
Ibn Arabī (d. 1240), and Mullā Íadrā (d. 1635). He also correctly identified 
a ‘school of Mullā Íadrā’, culminating with Sabzawārī (d. 1873) and even the 
influence on the Shaykhīs albeit as an offshoot (141–2). Like others before 
him – and even Iqbal – he saw the culmination of the monist tendency in 
the Babi-Bahai movement (he did not differentiate between them) (Horten 
1924: 144–53; de Gobineau 1923: 131–319). Horten’s judgements have not 
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entirely disappeared from the history of Islamic philosophy and it is striking 
how far his assessments coincide with the views expressed in the Development 
of Metaphysics in Persia.
Iqbal’s doctoral dissertation The Development of Metaphysics in Persia 
was (Iqbal 1908) published in 1908 followed shortly after by his Bedil in 
the Light of Bergson (Iqbal 1988). Mīrzā Abd al-Qādir Bēdil (1642–1720) 
was one of the great Indian poets of Persian and steeped in the intellectual 
traditions (Bēdil 1978, 1997; AªsanuÕÕafar 2009). His style and approach 
influenced major figures like Ghālib and, of course, Iqbal. While Iqbal’s prose 
works leave a lot to be desired when it comes to an analysis of the Islamic 
philosophical tradition, his poetry is far more subtle and informed and here 
is where the significance of Bēdil lies.
The latter in particular indicates the importance of Bēdil to his thought. 
He describes Bēdil as ‘a speculative thinker of the highest order, perhaps the 
greatest poet-thinker of India’, and remarks on the ‘staggeringly polyphonic 
character of his mind which appears to pass through the spiritual experiences 
of nearly all the great thinkers of the world’ (Iqbal 1988: 19–20). We find 
Iqbal deploying Bēdil in favour of both scepticism towards the ability of 
reason as well as an embrace of Sufi metaphysics and epistemology (of the 
school of Ibn Arabī) in favour of a sort of existentialism. Towards the end 
of this fascinating treatise, Iqbal sums up what we take from Bēdil (filtered 
through Bergsonian notions of duration and intuition) and reflects the attrac-
tion and frustration that he has with the intellectual tradition:
When we study Bēdil’s poems carefully we cannot fail to recognise that 
although his love of imaginative expression makes him impatient of logical 
analysis, he is fully conscious of the seriousness of his philosophical task. 
Considering his view of the nature of intelligence and the revelations of 
intuitions, it is obvious that his poetry treasures the great philosophical 
truth regarding the ultimate nature of reality, the details of which he ori-
ents in the spirit of a poet rather than a philosopher. The truth that we live 
forward and think backward, that the two opposing movements of thought 
and extension are inseparable in the original becoming is sufficiently clear in 
his poetry, yet we find in it nothing of the great wealth of illustrative details, 
nothing of the practical attitude towards time-experience that character-
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izes the philosophy of Bergson. In so far as the former point is concerned, 
I think, we cannot, in fairness, claim it for Bēdil, since he is essentially a 
poet, but we are surely entitled to claim for him the latter. Bēdil’s poetry, 
however, falsified expectation. All conceptual handling of reality according 
to him is absolutely valueless. He counsels us not to fall victim to the con-
crete, since the beauty of the mirror of life does not consist in its reflection. 
(Iqbal 1988: 34–5)
It is clear to see here what we would now call the problem of reification that 
lies in the reduction of the ineffable into concepts as a process of cultural cri-
tique, a forgetting of reality and the confusion of concepts for the reality that 
they supposedly describe (Honneth 2012). De-reification involves setting 
aside the amnesia, and a return to recognition and acknowledgement. For 
Iqbal, it is precisely the skill of the poet to grasp reality, to de-reify and com-
municate it without recourse to the confines of conceptualisation by linking 
the fruits of his imagination to that of the reader’s. From Avicenna to Mullā 
Íadrā, philosophers understood the limits of discourse and the significance of 
the human imagination to make the world that we inhabit.
His work on Bēdil through Bergson came at the end of his engagement 
with European thought that stemmed from his study at Cambridge (United 
Kingdom) and Heidelberg (Germany). He became an advanced student at 
Trinity College, University of Cambridge in 1905 and after examination was 
awarded in BA in Moral Sciences (the tripos was only renamed Philosophy in 
1970) through a dissertation ‘by special dispensation’ in June 1907 (Durrānī 
2003: 106f.). We cannot be sure what that dissertation is, but Durrānī sug-
gests that it was the same one submitted for the PhD at Munich examined in 
November 1907. He cites the registration papers from Cambridge in which 
Iqbal was named as a student of James Ward and J. M. McTaggart (d. 1925) 
working on the topic of ‘The Genesis and Development of Metaphysical 
Conceptions in Persia’ (Durrānī 2003: 149). McTaggart’s Hegelianism 
tinged with the intuitionism of Bergson had an important influence on Iqbal, 
including on his poetry (Majeed 1993). Within months, he was examined in 
Munich with his principal subject being Oriental philology – submitted 
in July and examined in November (Durrānī 2003: 174f.). It was published 
in Munich in the following year as The Development of Metaphysics in Persia 
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but was already circulating in that name as attested by Iqbal’s old mentor 
Thomas Arnold in October 1907 when he was Professor of Arabic at the 
University of London. Arnold praised it:
I have read Prof. Muhammad Ikbal’s dissertation ‘The Development of 
Metaphysics in Persia’ with much interest. So far as I am aware, it is the 
first attempt that has been made to trace the continuous development of 
ancient Iranian speculations as they have survived in Muhammadan phi-
losophy and so bring out the distinctively Persian character of many phases 
of Muslim thought. The writer has made use of much material hitherto 
unpublished and little known in Europe, and his dissertation is a valuable 
contribution to the history of Muhammadan philosophy. (cited in Durrānī 
2003: 178)
His examiners in Munich were not entirely convinced by his mastery of the 
Zoroastrian and medieval material. But they passed it because they felt that 
it drew sufficiently upon manuscript research and because they trusted the 
judgement of experts such as Arnold (Durrānī 2003: 182–8). It was a dis-
sertation in oriental philology and not philosophy because the committee was 
not satisfied with its quality in the latter area.
So what can we make of the Development? The first theme that is striking 
is the racial essentialisation of the Arab (or the Semitic) mind and the Persian 
mind with a strong sense that the decline of the former and the dominance of 
the latter has been detrimental to Islamic history. As he put it later in 1917 
there is an urgent need for Muslims to ‘[c]ome out of the fogs of Persianism 
and walk into the brilliant desert sunshine of Arabia’ (Iqbal cited in Harder 
2011: 163). Arabia in this sense is a privileged anti-colonial and pristine space 
of identity, a rather protestantised and Nietzschean framework for the articu-
lation of one’s selfhood devoid of mystical fog. In two further letters in 1917 
and 1919, he bemoaned the decadence of Persianised mysticism not only 
because of its pantheism and its other-worldiness but also its denial of human 
agency (Harder 2011: 167f.). The real question that faces us is to consider 
whether Iqbal begins with a passion for the monistic thought of the school 
of Ibn Arabī as articulated in India and ‘championed’ in the Development 
and later abandons it in favour of a more otherworldy, protestantised faith of 
the emergent and dynamic self, or whether he actually continued to embrace 
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a form of monism as seen in his poetry of later years identifying Bēdil in 
particular as the key exemplar of that ‘Islamic intellectual tradition’. One can 
further see the possible influence of Bergson insofar as he rejects time as an 
oppressive structure that destines humans to their ends as we see him argue in 
the Reconstruction (Iqbal 1990, 49–54; cf. Diagne 2011: 91–115). He owes 
in this insight as much to the Leibnizian critique of fatalism as to Bergson’s 
vitality of life.
A number of commentators have pointed out the mistakes in the 
Development while acknowledging his originality (being practically the first 
person writing in a European language to discuss Mullā Íadrā – Browne and 
de Gobineau having already done so) (Mir 2006: 78–80). Nevertheless, it 
would be a mistake to consider its study now as a mere exercise in antiquari-
anism. It indicates much about the development of Iqbal’s own thought and 
his relationship to Sufi monism in particular, which constitutes the essence 
of ‘metaphysics’ for him. Much like Corbin, after him, he traces ideas from 
their pre-Islamic origins through the world of Islam into their culmination 
with the heterodoxies of the nineteenth century. In his very dedication to 
Arnold, he acknowledges what he owes to European thought. He begins with 
an interesting paradox:
The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is their 
love of metaphysics speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches the extant 
literature of Persian expecting to find any comprehensive systems of thought 
. . . will have to turn back disappointed. (Iqbal 1908: vii)
An odd judgement, since in the very introduction he cites the manuscripts 
that he consulted for his study that include a number of ‘systematic’ works of 
philosophy and philosophical theology, such as Óikmat al-ayn of Dabīrān 
Kātibī Qazwīnī (d. 1276) along with the commentaries on it by Mīrak 
Bukhārī and Mīr Óusayn Maybudī (d. 1502) and the ‘collected works of 
Avicenna’. He consulted classic works of Sufism including Mishkāt al-anwār 
of al-Ghazālī, Awārif al-maārif of Umar al-Suhrawardī, Kashf al-maªjūb 
of Alī Hujvīrī, as well as classic works of Persian Neoplatonism such as 
the translation of Aristotle’s De Anima by Bābā Afżal Kāshānī and of the 
illuminationist tradition such as the Anvārīya of Hiravī, commenting on the 
Óikmat al-ishrāq of Suhrawardī. More intriguing is his citation of the Óurūfī 
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classic the Jāvīdān-nāma. Although he does not mention these in the manu-
script list at the beginning, it is clear that his reading of the later school of Ibn 
Arabī is dependent on Jīlī’s al-Insān al-kāmil (that was widely available in 
India as manuscripts and lithographs attest) and on Persian metaphysics the 
Sadrian text Asrār-i ªikam of Hādi Sabzavārī (d. 1873) that had been litho-
graphed in 1883. What is striking is the relative absence of any mark of the 
metaphysical curriculum of the dars-e niÕāmī. The issue is that Iqbal seems to 
understand that the later Islamic philosophical tradition was somewhat bifur-
cated between the more mystically inclined monisms of Sufi thought and the 
rather more Aristotelianising philosophical and theological tradition – as he 
acknowledges in his aims to trace the ‘logical continuity of Persian thought 
. . . in the language of modern philosophy’ and discuss ‘the subject of Íūfīism 
in a more scientific manner’, in which the latter plays an important part in 
‘awaken[ing] the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of life’ (Iqbal 1908: x–xi).
The work itself is divided into six chapters in two parts – the first on 
Persian dualism deals with Zoroaster and the second on ‘Greek dualism’ 
begins with the Avicennan (and Neoplatonic) tradition moving onto kalām 
(as Islamic rationalism) before shifting to Sufism and Sabzavārī and the Bāb 
as expressions of a return to Persian dualism (which is what he sees the 
Illuminationist tradition doing) and pantheism. The middle sections on 
‘rationalism’ owe much to his teacher Shiblī Numānī’s study of the develop-
ment of Islamic theology, as well as to Orientalist studies of kalām, including 
the Cureton edition of the doxographical al-Milal wa-l-niªal of Shahrastānī 
that was published in British India two generations before Iqbal (Iqbal 1908: 
33, 72). What is striking in the first part is his stress on dualism and the rela-
tive absence of pantheism in ancient Persian thought while emphasizing its 
metaphysical speculation (20f.). This absence is meant to express his critique.
With the advent of Islam, one saw the transition from the ‘objective 
attitude of pre-Islamic Persian philosophy to the subjective attitude of later 
thinkers’, and it is worth remembering that subjectivity in all senses are posi-
tive qualities for Iqbal (23). The section on Avicenna seems to draw primarily 
on Mehren’s edition of his ‘mystical works’, focusing on the treatise on love 
and the doctrine on the soul – but even here there is no reference to either of 
his major works that were studied in India, the Shifā and the Ishārāt, nor to 
his major reconstruction of the Aristotelian tradition in his logic, his meta-
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physics of radical contingency, and his proof for the immateriality of the soul. 
Given more recent research that has identified the prominence of the study 
of logical puzzles and problems in identifying major terms in syllogisms, 
the complete absence of logic and how it relates to metaphysics in ‘Persian’ 
thought as practised in India is remarkable and further demonstrates Iqbal’s 
alienation from traditional modes of scholarship (Ahmed 2013, forthcom-
ing). Similarly, his championing of Ghazāli and distancing him from the 
Asharī tradition owes much to both Shiblī and to the Orientalist scholarship 
on him. Similarly, while critical of reducing Sufism to a borrowing from 
Indian or Neoplatonic thought, he focuses upon its metaphysics of monism. 
A large part of this is identifying the Illuminationist tradition as Sufi because 
of its emphasis on reality as light (Iqbal 1908: 120–50). Noteworthy is his 
association of the identity thesis or the doctrine of immediate knowledge 
with Leibniz’s law of identity. The section on Sufism ends with an exposition 
of Jīlī – but in rather Hegelian terms in which the ‘pure undelimited being’ 
of Sufi terminology becomes the Hegelian absolute, and the undifferentiated 
‘cloud’ (al-amā) is described as the ‘Unconsciousness’ (151–74). One gets 
the impression that the defence of ‘pantheism’ in Sufism owes much to its 
respectability in Hegel for Iqbal. The final chapter on later Persian thought 
starts with Sabzavārī as heir to Mullā Íadrā’s tempering of monism through 
what we would call the doctrine of modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) and the 
recovery of Plato. The Bābī and later Bahāī developments take us back to 
the redefinition of the Hegelian Absolute as love and will. In conclusion, 
Iqbal states that the ‘Persian mind’ has struggled long with the dualism of 
the ancient Persians and of the Greeks and has often sided with the monism 
of the Sufi tradition. Nevertheless in his praise of the ‘political reform’ of 
the Bābīs one can discern a criticism of a mysticism that is excessively other-
worldly (195).
His later career in India first as an academic and then as a barrister led 
to his political engagement (he was knighted in 1922 and later took part in 
the Roundtable conference in London in 1931 and 1932). His more radical 
Urdu poetry in the form of Shikvā and Javāb-e shikvā and his Bāl-e Jibrīl 
(Gabriel’s Wing) and Żarb-e kalīm (Strike of Moses) in 1936 as well as his 
Persian trilogy of Asrār-e khudī (Secrets of the Self) in 1915, Rumūz-e bēkhudī 
(Mysteries of Selflessness) in 1918, and Payām-e mashriq (Message of the 
HILLIER 9780748695416 PRINT.indd   127 30/04/2015   15:54
128 | muhammad iqbal
East) in 1922, a response to Goethe’s Westöstlicher Divan, and Jāvīdnāma 
in 1932, his response to Dante taking Rūmī as his guide, took on a more 
independent, universal, and prophetic quality. Interestingly, the two names 
that come up the most in the Persian oeuvre are Nietzsche and Goethe (cf. 
Schimmel 1977). Hermann Hesse wrote in the introduction to the German 
verse translation of Jāvīdnāma in 1957:
Sir Muhammad Iqbal belongs to three kingdoms of the spirit: three king-
doms of the spirit are the sources of his extraordinary work: the world 
of India, the world of Islam, and that of Occidental thought. A Muslim 
of Indian decent, trained spiritually by the Koran, by the Vedanta and by 
Persian-Arabic mysticism, but also strongly touched by the problems of 
Western philosophy and conversant with Bergson and Nietzsche, leads us 
in ascending spirals through the provinces of his cosmos. (Schimmel 1977: 
268)
But was there a return to the tradition? In his correspondence with Nicholson, 
who later translated Asrār-e khudī, he claimed that the philosophy of the 
work was based on the Sufi classics, so even if it seemed that he was draw-
ing on Bergson and Nietzsche his sources were Rūmī, Irāqī, and Jīlī (Dar 
1971: 26f.). Of course, there is an element of self-fashioning in this state-
ment. The themes of his poetry – that reveal his philosophical positions 
and contrapuntal readings quite clearly – demonstrate both the mark of his 
study of the Islamic traditions, focusing on monism as well as the influences 
of British and German thought, the latter of which included romanticism, 
socialism, existentialism, and so forth. Perhaps one of the most common 
approaches to Iqbal is to consider him to be an existentialist. This is exempli-
fied in the work of Latif Kazmi, the late critic, philosopher, and poet Syed 
Waheed Akhtar and most Urdu critics, and focusing upon the notion of the 
selfhood defined by human action and motion, in which personhood arises 
not from the substantiality of the human but from the conglomeration of 
her acts. Akhtar explicitly connects Iqbal to the Christian existentialism of 
Kierkegaard and the sense of despair that arose out of the rise in scientism 
and the predicament of modernity that seemed to diminish humans and their 
traditional anthropocentric approach to reality (1977). Although he does 
not explicitly mention him and almost all citations come from the European 
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tradition, Akhtar’s reading of Iqbal seems to be filtered by the later Islamic 
philosophical tradition of Mullā Íadrā that privileges existence over essences, 
process over substance, the creative over the passive, and the monist over 
the pluralist and that dissolves the subject–object dichotomy recalling the 
doctrines of a‚ālat al-wujūd, ªaraka jawharīya, ittiªād al-āqil wa-l-maqūl, 
and basī† al-ªaqīqa kull al-ashyā (Akhtar 1977: 111; cf. Akhtar 1981). Kazmi 
extends the approach by carefully examining the poetry to bring out the basic 
features of existentialism that he locates in the emphasis on human agency, 
human free will and creativity, the revolt against the personal, and the desire 
to overcome alienation in the modern world (1997: 67–100).
Iqbal’s existentialism is about the action and significance of human agency 
to make one’s life and a complete rejection of fatalism – which is one of the 
reasons why he rejects the pantheism of waªdat al-wujūd in Development. His 
use of al-Óallāj in Jāvīdnāma is thus an appropriation of the idea of submis-
sion in God to effect human freedom and force the human to act (Diagne 
2011: 22). Critical to this process is the desire to act freely and without fear 
as expressed in his Rumūz (31). This autonomy of the self then plays out in 
the political sphere with his famous 1930 speech (33–8).
Nevertheless, the self is poised between the godless, spiritless existential-
ism of the West and the monistic fatalism of the East. As he says in his poem 
the ‘Death of Selfhood’ in Żarb-e kalīm:
The death of the self lies in the darkened innards of the West
The death of the self lies in the leprous loss in the East.
The death of the self is shown in the lack of soul in the Arab, losing his 
zeal
Possessing Iraq and Iran but without limbs or veins.
Indians have lost too their self,
Making the prison the norm and forbidding themselves freedom.
The true death of the self is the figure of the shaykh in Mecca
Who lives on the sale of the robes that pilgrims don. (Iqbal 1987a: 69)
But one of the issues is that many Muslim existentialists use Iqbal to deploy 
their own sense of an Islamic existentialism in which submission means 
freedom to be and in which the Quran is read as a ‘hymn to liberty’ and 
where a ‘self-islam’ emerges, not one which is individualistic and selfish but 
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the realisation of selfhood that produces a diverse community (cf. Bidar 
2008).
In that sense, Iqbal’s notion of selfhood, influenced as it was by Nietzsche, 
retained a spiritual core:
Man in whom egohood has reached its relative perfection, occupies a genu-
ine place in the heart of divine creative energy and thus possesses a higher 
degree of reality than things around him. Of all the creations of God, 
he alone is capable of consciously participating in the creative life of the 
Maker. (Iqbal 1990: 82)
Selfhood in God is the key aspect of Iqbal’s philosophy as initiated in his 
Asrār-e khudī in 1915 and Rumūz-e bēkhudī in 1918. This self is directly 
related to the divine spirit that comes from God’s command and his 
privileging the human through the provision of a free personhood that 
holds the vicegerency of God over the cosmos (Iqbal 1990: 95–8). That 
self is also, contra James, not reductive to the sum of its experiences, nor 
is it some mere duration as a framework for first-person perspectives (as 
Bergson may have put it). But this selfhood’s assertion is not an arro-
gant vanity of self-centeredness as he put it in his introduction to Asrār-e 
khudī. Khudī is thus the ever-self-conscious ground for the agency of the 
human and its ‘boundless energy’. Iqbal uses Bergson’s notion of the self 
that endures even through change. In the opening to Critical Evolution, he 
writes:
I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I work 
or I do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. 
Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas – such are the changes into which my 
existence is divided and which colours it in turns. I change, then, without 
ceasing. For I speak of my states as if it were a block . . . that it remains the 
same during all the time that it prevails. (Bergson 2007: 1)
This notion of the persistence of the self in change recalls the idea of motion 
in substance that lay at the heart of late NeoPlatonic psychology as well as 
the thought of Mullā Íadrā. Yet personhood lies in the act and not in the 
substance for Iqbal:
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My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to each other and 
held together by the unity of a directive purpose. My whole personality lies 
in my directive attitude. (Iqbal 1990: 103)
The becoming of the person draws upon Rūmī and Jīlī in his work on the 
perfect human. This becoming sets aside the Graeco-Arabic notion of the 
immortality and eternity of the soul in favour of a selfhood that is earned 
through action and persists through one’s effort refuting both determinism 
and teleology. In the Reconstruction, he states that ‘personal immortality is 
not ours of right. It is to be achieved by personal effort’ (Iqbal 1990: 119). 
And in Asrār-e khudī, addressing the self that is realised as God’s vicegerent, 
he says:
Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest
Thou art the goal of life’s caravan. (Iqbal 1973b: 46; Nicholson 1920: 84)
Or in one of the most famous of his Urdu verses rejecting fatalism:
Raise up your selfhood so that before each fate is sealed
God addresses his servant and asks him: what is your desire?
He also uses Rūmī to privilege love over reason as the human attribute imi-
tating the divine (Khanum 1982: 51–56, 72f.). God, as goal, is the true 
NeoPlatonic beloved. Love motivates and ‘pricks’ the human to act in search 
of the beloved. As he puts the words in the mouth of al-Óallāj in Jāvīdnāma:
Life without prickings is no true life
One must live with a fire under one’s feet. (Arberry cited in Khanum 
1982: 52)
The archetypal journey to the beloved is the ascension of the Prophet (the 
mirāj), which is invoked in the Bāl-e Jibrīl and that transcends the epistemic 
duality of subject–object in the Prophet’s monistic experience:
Beyond the sphere of knowledge, there is for the man of faith
The bliss of longing, the blessing of the meeting. (Iqbal 1973b: 49)
The goal of love in unitive experience remains at the level of the ineffable or 
the inarticulate – as Iqbal says in Reconstruction: ‘The incommunicability of 
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mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate 
feeling, untouched by the discursive intellect’ (1990: 21).
Yet at the same time in his verse and in his Development, we see a searing 
critique of waªdat al-wujūd sometimes defined in much of the secondary 
literature in South Asia as ‘pantheism’ (cf. Dar 1978). He plays on the tra-
ditional topos of the conflict between eros and nomos and the victory of the 
former in Bāl-e Jibrīl:
Breath, not heart, stirs in your body: no elation
Stirs the assembly at the words you fashion.
Leave reason behind for its light is the lamp
that shows the road, not marks the destination. (Kiernan 1946: 67)
Love wins the day in Jāvīdnāma:
Love in the soul is like sight in the eye
Be it within the house or without the door;
Love is at once both ashes and spark.
Its work is loftier than religion and science.
Love is authority and manifest proof
Both worlds are subject to the seal-ring of love;
Timeless it is, and yesterday and tomorrow spring from it;
When it supplicates God for selfhood
All the world becomes a mount, itself a rider.
Through love the draw of this ancient inn becomes void;
Lovers yield themselves up to God,
Give interpretative reason as an offering.
Are you a lover? Proceed from direction to directionlessness;
Make death a thing prohibited to yourself. (Iqbal 1973a: 32–3; Arberry 
1966: 32)
The resulting self realised being can ascend to the vicegerency of the divine. 
As he says in Asrār-e khudī:
His genius abounds with life and desires to manifest itself
He will bring another world into existence
He bestows life by miraculous action,
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He renovates old ways of life.
He gives a new explanation of life
A new interpretation of this dream. (Iqbal 1973b: 45; Nicholson 1920: 
80)
In Bāl-e Jibrīl he puts it thus:
May be brick or stone or the harp or the letter or sound
The miracle of art is the result of the heart-blood (khūn-e jigar).
A drop of the heart-blood makes the stone a heart,
From heart-blood are sound and burning and joy and melody
What is originality of thought and action?
An urge to revolution!
What is originality of thought and action?
A renaissance of national life!
It is the source of life’s miracles
Transforming granite into the purest pearls. (Schimmel 1963: 71)
In Naqsh-e farang, he prefers Rūmī to Goethe because the latter is not a 
prophet but a writer. Hegel’s reason seems to be lofty but remains in matter 
and he fails to find love through reason. Nietzsche is superficially attractive 
but mired in egoism. There is a constant sense of negotiation between self, 
love, and the divine that brings to the fore his philosophical influences. What 
Iqbal does take from the tradition is the notion of the human inspired and 
enchanted by God, the individual who makes his destiny. Not for him is the 
mystical otherworldliness of much of the philosophical and mystical tradition 
that went before him.
Reconstruction is a modernist project, to revitalise the tradition and show 
it in conformity with science and the facts of modernity (cf. Sheikh 1978). 
Iqbal very explicitly sees himself as the heir to al-Afghani as expressed not 
only in the lectures but in his verse (Diagne 2011: 42f.). Part of this attitude 
is a rethinking of Plato away from the master of conformity and from enemy 
to friend of an open society (44–6). Unlike the Development, this text is far 
more concerned with the here and now, and the problem that individuals 
face in achieving the possibility of religion and of religious experience. The 
key problem that faces modern Islam is of thinking Muslims making sense 
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of themselves as religious beings in an intellectual world that has rejected the 
traditional Platonic metaphysics, politics, and ethics that were central to the 
tradition (Mir 2006: 80–117). Development dealt with theological dogmas, 
while Reconstruction addresses the realities and activities of faith. His fresh 
approach is to reconsider the Quran in the light of his training, divorced 
from the influence of Greek thought that he felt has led to a deterministic 
reading that stifles human freedom and creativity (Iqbal 1990: 3f.). Like 
Imām, as we saw above, he felt that the act of reconstruction was necessary 
due to the stagnation of Muslim thought since the medieval period (7). 
The monism of the Sufi tradition is set aside in favour of the affirmation of 
selfhood that arises from al-Óallāj’s famous, ‘I am the creative truth’ (Iqbal 
1990: 96). The possibility of religion relates to the need to assert the self as 
the recipient of revelation and to this end he cites an anonymous Sufi: ‘no 
understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to 
the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet’ (181). Pantheistic Sufism 
is as much criticised for its ethics and as its otherworldliness (90). But there 
remains much of a romantic attachment to the poetic vision of that tradition 
as evinced in his citations of Rūmī and indeed of his concluding with his own 
Jāvīdnāma (91, 199).
Many of the major metaphysical thinkers of the Islamic tradition are 
cited like they are in the Development. Perhaps one of the key ideas of the 
Reconstruction is about the human spirit being in motion, in the process of 
ever becoming creatively. This idea partly draws on Bergson but equally is 
predicated on the notion of the graded degrees of being that he cites as an 
idea stemming from Suhrawardī (and then from Mullā Íadrā) that implies 
the becoming and changing of the substance of the human, the concept of 
substantial motion in Mullā Íadrā (71). He even offers an original reading of 
Mīr Dāmād’s concept of perpetual creation, an idea that was debated in India 
(cf. Rizvi 2011). Because the creation of the ego lies in the perpetual ‘change 
without succession’, it remains eternal, and eternally creative and becoming 
(Iqbal 1990: 77). Thus, he modifies a theory of the creation of the cosmos to 
suit his purposes of the possibilities of the human.
Iqbal remains a fascinating thinker, creatively engaging with the European 
intellectual traditions of his time, self-orientalising but even interpreting ele-
ments of the Islamic philosophical traditions in innovative ways. Ultimately, 
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the problem is that critics have insisted on reading Iqbal as philosopher and as 
poet separately, and even then as a programmatic poet with a clear didactic-
pedagogical intent as dominating the art. As Shamsur Rahman Faruqi puts 
it:
[T]he problem arises when one is made to read Iqbāl not for pleasure, but 
for profit. For Iqbāl is also a politician’s poet, a religious thinker’s poet, 
and a philosopher’s poet, and much more besides. Iqbāl has earned a lot 
of praise, and not a little blame as well, for being one or the other of these. 
(Faruqi 2005: 1)
He himself gave them good reason to do so in two well-known letters from 
1919 to Sayyid Shaukat Óusain and Sayyid Sulaimān Nadvī feigning his 
skills as a poet and deeming it secondary (Barnī cited in Faruqi 2005: 7). 
However, poetry was known to have a major role in mobilisation – and the 
timing is quite revealing in the midst of the nationalist fervour of the Khilafat 
movement in which poetry played an essential role (Minault 1974). The myth 
of the person assumes a great philosopher, a great poet, and a great historian 
– and a consistency. But as one sees in his prose works, we have an insightful 
thinker who has not entirely reconciled his differing positions and influences, 
and a historian of thought whose judgements strike us as bizarrely essential-
ist if not just wrong. What survives in many ways is the poetry and that is 
where the engagement with the tradition is best seen not just because of his 
programmatic approach but because both the changing style, language, dic-
tion, metre, and even concerns reveal the development of a modernist deeply 
engaged by his intellectual tradition while resisting its charms in search of a 
political theology that works. We would be better served if we understand 
that poetry is a type of fiction, a working of the imagination, and at the very 
least reveals his philosophical and political imaginary in creative contrapuntal 
ways in which we cannot read the prose (Faruqi 2005: 12–15). And this 
was possible precisely because he composed poetry within traditions: ghazals 
recalling Ghālib, Bēdil, and Dāgh, and masnavīs that referenced and invoked 
Amīr Khusraw, Rūmī, Sauda, and Mīr Anīs (Kermode cited in Faruqi 2005: 
15). Ultimately, the Islamic intellectual tradition for Iqbal is Bēdil whose 
emotion of wonder he extols (recovering the ‘pantheistic tradition’):
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There are fragilities contained in the illusion-house of wonder
Do not blink lest the desire for show continue. (Iqbal 2012: 75)
And he sums him up in Żarb-e kalīm:
Is this the Reality, or the mischief wrought
By my false-seeing eye?
The earth, the wilderness, the mountain range,
The dark-blue sky,
Some say: It is; others, it is not,
Who knows if this your world exists at all.
How well Mirzā Bēdil unknotted this knot
Whose unraveling has been
So hard for the Philosopher:
‘If the heart had enough space, this garden
Were sightless: the wine’s hue chose to come out
Because the wine-flask didn’t have enough room.’ (Iqbal 1973a: 103; 
Faruqi 2005: 26)
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